Abstract -This paper estimates the importance of strategy, scale and policy in determining the pattern of exit in the Australian car industry. Previous studies found only a weak role for strategy in exit from declining industries. Using a new dataset and improvements on the specification used in earlier studies, we find stronger evidence that strategy influences the pattern of exit where economies of scale are less important. Protection is also found to negatively influence the likelihood of exit.
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I. Introduction
Over the last forty-two years, the number of assembly plants in the Australian car industry has shrunk from twenty-four to currently just four. This dramatic reorganization occurred while the government actively and extensively intervened to support the industry. Competition, government policy and firm strategies have all shaped the pattern of exit over this period but the importance of each has not been assessed. A recent theoretical literature on firm exit has highlighted how firm strategies may shape the pattern of exit in a declining industry (Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985 & 1990) . Most empirical work though suggests competition effectively determines the pattern, with only plants that achieve economies of scale surviving (Deily (1991) Lieberman (1990) ). However, for the car industry in Australia and many other manufacturing industries, especially in Europe and Japan, government intervention may also be important. As speculation continues on the possibility of another domestic car manufacturer closing such a study is timely.
In this paper, we perform an econometric analysis of exit in the Australian car industry. In particular, we estimate a model of exit using a panel of data for nearly all plants that operated between 1920 and 1999. We find a negative relationship between protection and the likelihood of exit. By using a specification that permits different relationships between size and exit at different sizes, unlike in previous work, we estimate strategic behavior also determines the pattern of exit as well as cost advantages due to economies of scale. This new finding may also result from using a differentiated products industry, where cost advantages are less important. Earlier studies used data from homogeneous product industries, like chemicals and steel.
Furthermore, we provide a first direct test of the role of cost structure in determining the pattern of exit. We also attempt to assess whether the Button Plan resulted in a 2 different pattern of exit. Finally, the dataset used for this paper is new and is more extensive than that used in earlier empirical studies of the Australian car industry.
The results of our study are significant in several respects. First, we provide the first econometric evidence of strategic effects on the pattern of exit highlighted in the theoretical work. This result, though, still highlights the tension between the strategic behaviour induced by the small numbers of firms and the economies of scale that produced the oligopoly. Beyond relatively small sizes it appears that taking advantage of economies of scale is required to survive in the car industry. Third, we provide mixed evidence of the role of government in the industry. While higher tariffs appear to reduce the likelihood of exit, it appears the Button Plan altered the settings without altering the relationships between the other determinants and the likelihood of exit. Though the model does not enable structural forecasting of the effects of policy changes on exit, the findings are suggestive. Though all four plants feature high, by Australian standards, capacities, further tariff cuts will increase the likelihood of exit and the smallest plant, of Mitsubishi, is the most likely to close. 1 In the next section of the paper, the theoretical framework and previous empirical work are surveyed. This is followed by background on the industry in which we argue that it is a particularly good case in which to examine these issues. An econometric specification for testing, and the data are introduced. Estimation is performed and the results discussed. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
II. Theory and Evidence on Exit
In this section we review the economic theory and empirical evidence on the determinants of exit. After reviewing the textbook theory, and subsequent research on the role of strategy and innovation, following Gibson and Harris (1996) we present six hypotheses and then review the empirical evidence in support of each of them.
Textbook microeconomic theory suggests it is the least profitable plants that close when demand falls or cost rises. So when demand declines for an industry with some economies of scale it is the smallest plants that would be expected to close.
However, findings from research on industry dynamics and strategy suggest the negative relationship between size and closure when demand declines may not hold.
First, the theoretical literature on industry dynamics suggests exit can result not from declining demand or rising costs but rather failure to innovate. The model of Jovanovic (1982) features entrants with in built quality that is discovered over time after entry. Entrants exit upon discovering they are low quality. Ericson and Pakes (1995) consider firms performing research that determines their quality. Firms that do not or unsuccessfully research exit. In both of these models exit is not directly correlated with demand or size. Jovanovic (1982) implies a negative relationship between age and the likelihood of exit. However, this relationship also results if newer capital equipment has a higher resale value (Baden-Fuller (1989) ).
Even if demand in an oligopoly is declining the relationship between size and survival implied in the textbooks may not hold. The striking result of the work of Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) (hereafter G&N) is that the subgame perfect equilibrium of an exit game, where firms produce at capacity (without economies of scale), is that firms close in order of size with the largest firms closing first.
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The intuition for this result is as follows. There are two firms, one with a larger capacity than the other. Size is built into the model by assuming marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost at all outputs below capacity for both firms. Hence both small and large firms always produce at capacity. Demand declines over time.
The game begins when it is no longer profitable for both firms to continue. Firms choose the time of exit. There are two Nash equilibria, each featuring one firm exiting immediately and the other remaining until operating is no longer profitable. Each features a threat to outlast the other firm. The equilibrium in which the large firm exits first, though, is the only subgame perfect equilibrium. This is because, as the small firm is not committed to producing large outputs, only the small firm can credibly commit to outlasting its rival by recovering any losses as a monopoly. Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) further argue that if a firm can continuously shrink rather than only completely close, the largest firms shrink until all firms are similarly sized, after which all firms shrink together. When demand declines, excess capacity has no strategic value so it is shut down. But if firms have to close plants of unequal size, the positive relationship between size and the likelihood of exit no longer necessarily holds. A plant closing conveys benefits to other plants of the firm that it internalizes (Whinston (1988) ). However, Ghemawat (1997) surveys further extensions to their papers and finds their main results are generally robust. Dierickx, Matutes and Neven (1991) consider exit under different types of declining demand for two types of firms. If there is a reduction in consumer willingness to pay for a product due, for example, to the entry of a superior substitute, then the firm with relatively low fixed cost and high variable costs exits first. As the willingness to pay declines (for example, the demand curve shifting downwards), price no longer covers marginal cost. But if there is shrinkage in the customer base (for example the demand curve solely tilting inwards), then the high fixed cost and low variable cost firm exits first. While some customers remain willing to pay a high price for the car, not enough remain to cover the large fixed costs of operating. (Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) ).
Strategy (Weak):
There is a positive relationship between the number of plants a firm has and the likelihood of exit (Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) Age: There is a negative relationship between age and the likelihood of exit Jovanovic (1982) , Baden-Fuller (1989) Old Age: There is a positive relationship between age and the likelihood of exit Deily (1988) If the first hypothesis is satisfied competition, under economies of scale, determines the pattern of exit. If the second hypothesis is satisfied, then firm strategy unambiguously determines the pattern of exit. If the third hypothesis is satisfied, this supports strategy as the determinant. However, Harrigan (1980) and Baden-Fuller (1989) Deily (1988) , in another study of the U.S. steel industry, finds support for the old age hypothesis.
Further support for the age and scale hypotheses are found in a series of empirical papers on industry dynamics (see Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998) for recent surveys). In particular it is noted that entry and exit rates are highly correlated, with exit rates highest among recent, small, entrants. In addition, the lower the sunk costs associated with entry the greater the association of exit with industry changes.
In summary, while economic theory suggests any of competition, strategy or failed innovation could drive exit, the empirical evidence to date provides only weak support for the hypothesis that strategy determines exit. Instead, there is a consistent pattern of support for first, the textbook hypothesis that competition drives out small high cost plants and, second, that relatively new plants are more likely to close.
III. The Australian Car Industry 3
In this section, we describe the Australian car industry for two reasons. First, to highlight the features that make it a suitable and distinctive case for testing the hypotheses that scale and strategy determine the pattern of exit. Second, to highlight the role government policy has played in shaping the industry and, hence, as a determinant of exit. We will refer repeatedly to Table 2 , which contains some descriptive statistics about the industry.
For strategy to be a possible determinant of exit, the car industry must have been an oligopoly. This is demonstrated in rows two and three of Table 2 . Using domestic registration data, we calculate four and eight firm concentration ratios at the midpoints of each of five periods. The four firm ratio has not fallen below 69% and the eight firm ratio has not fallen below 78%. Furthermore, potential competition from imports has been restricted by substantial tariffs and other protective measures.
The second feature required for testing these hypotheses is that the industry experiences declining demand. Though Table 2 suggests registrations declined only between 1974 and 1983, this hides considerable variation across broad groups of cars.
Examining exponential growth rates by period for each group of cars by nationality (English, European, Japanese and US) reveals falling registrations for all groups assembling in Australia after 1974 except for the Japanese. Furthermore, registrations
for European cars started declining in 1964 and for English cars, from the early 1950s.
Hence most assemblers for a substantial proportion of the sample period experienced declining demand. 1920 -1947 1948 -1963 1964 -1974 1975 -1983 1984 -1998 Note: the concentration ratios are calculated using shares of registrations at the midpoint of each period, except for period one, when cumulative registrations, as reported in the 1948 census, are used. * 1950-1963 -to avoid distortions in the immediate postwar period.
The Australian car industry is distinctive from those considered in earlier studies for three reasons. First, is that differentiated rather than homogeneous products are produced. Differentiation reduces the importance of the strategic disadvantage of size but also the importance of economies of scales. Hence, there is the possibility that strategy plays a greater role in determining exit than in steel and chemicals where economies of scale are likely to be more important.
Differentiation, though, also means exit is no longer identical to plant closure.
In a homogeneous products industry, a change in the ownership of assets (keeping industry numbers constant) has no effect on the industry equilibrium. But in a differentiated products industry, a change in ownership while not altering the engineering characteristics of an industry could have competitive consequences.
Hence, a substantial change in ownership will be treated as an exit and entry. For example, when Mitsubishi purchased the Chrysler plants, Chrysler is recorded as having exited, and Mitsubishi as having entered.
The second reason that the car industry is distinctive is that it provides an opportunity to test the cost type hypothesis of Dierickx et al (1991) . The car industry has been regulated in five periods as summarized in Table 3 .
Each period is distinctive in terms of the mix of instruments used and the aims of the protection. Particularly clear accounts of the degree of protection are provided in Stubbs (1972 ) Gregory (1988 and the Industry Commission (1997).
Referring to Table 2 , like many industries considered in the empirical industry dynamics literature, entry and exit are correlated. In particular, during the high growth period many small assembly plants entered and then exited.
The second feature notable from 
-2000
Button Plan: tariffs falling after 1988; tariff-quota system (til 1988), export facilitation expanded
Aim to create industry that will survive at low rates of protection. Encourage exports.
IV. The Econometric Models
In this section, the set of econometric models estimated in section VI is presented. After discussing how we extend the Basic specification used in other papers for our dataset (discussed in more detail in section V), we introduce two sets of extensions (the Extended and Full specifications), and discuss the sensitivity analysis.
Most related empirical work has begun with a cross section of plants in one period of declining demand. 
For explanatory variables, measures of size (Size), the number of plants (Multiplant) and age (Age) and other controls, depending on the industry and environment, are used. This is referred to as the Basic specification.
Because our dataset is an unbalanced panel of plants through multiple periods of growing demand and declining demand rather than a cross section, we make one The two controls we include in our Basic specification are measures of the growth of demand, D mkt , and the level of protection, Tariff, as summarized in equation (2):
If the coefficient on all size variables is negative then the Scale hypothesis is supported and competition determines the pattern of exit. 
If Size -and Size -2 have different signs this allows for competition and strategy to play different roles in determining exit, depending on the size of the plant. Otherwise the interpretation of the coefficients is as before.
In our Full specification, we introduce two variables to better control for cost differences across plants. In particular, to test the Cost Type hypothesis we introduce the dummy variable (PT -) defined as follows: In addition, we introduce a measure of the number of models assembled at the plant (Models) to capture the failure to achieve economies of scale represented by size. The Full specification is summarized in equation (4) 
The coefficient on Models is expected to be positive. As we have argued that the negative growth reflected a decline in the willingness to pay, if the coefficient on PTis negative this supports the Cost Type hypothesis. Otherwise the hypothesis is rejected or the decline in demand is best characterized as a decline in customer base. 
V. Highlights of the data
The sample includes all manufacturing plants and nearly all assembly plants that operated in the Australian car industry from 1920 -2000. 4 For each plant, for each of the five periods as defined in Table 3 in which it operates, the dependant variable, as defined in equation (1) is calculated and a matching set of explanatory variables compiled. As discussed earlier, a plant is stated to have exited if it ceases assembling cars or if there is a change in the main make assembled.
The definitions of the explanatory variables required for each of the models and the sensitivity tests are summarized in Table 4 . Three items of data require further explanation. Relative size is used rather than absolute size to capture the competitive pressure -a 22,000 cars per year plant is large in 1938 but small in 1988. While registrations declined for English cars in period 2, it is treated as an expanding period as nearly all assemblers expanded capacity during the period. Similarly, while registrations growth is (just) positive for Japanese manufacturers in period 5, this is treated as a declining period as tariffs were coming down. Finally, estimates of plant capacities are not obtainable from one source so we trawled various sources to obtain estimates. Engineering estimates are used where possible. If these are unavailable, then maximum registrations for each period are used as a proxy. More details are provided in the data appendix.
VI. Results
In this section, we present the results of estimating the specifications outlined in section IV. First, we estimate the Basic specification and obtain the same results as earlier work that suggests competition drives exit rather than strategy. Then we estimate the Extended specification, which yields a positive relationship between size and the likelihood of exit at smaller plant sizes. The tariff rate is found to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of exit, suggesting government policy reduced the rate of exit. Age squared is found to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of exit consistent with the industry dynamics literature. However, estimating the Full specification does not yield support for the Cost Type hypothesis.
The sensitivity tests suggest our results are fairly robust.
(i) Results
The results of estimating the Basic, Extended and Full specifications are presented in Table 5 . The specifications vary from those proposed in Section IV in two ways. First Size + 2 is omitted from the Extended and Full models as it is highly correlated with Size + resulting in the coefficients on both being insignificant from zero. Second, Age 2 replaces Age as it is found to be significant whereas Age is not and together both are insignificant. Tariff In summary, these estimates provide the first econometric evidence supporting the Strategy (Strong) hypothesis, over relatively small plant sizes. This, though, highlights a tension in the application of game theoretic models to oligopolies.
Oligopolies exist when economies of scale combined with barriers to entry result in a 5 The test is performed comparing the basic specification with an encompassing specification of the two models. The encompassing specification (with a log likelihood statistic of -43.858) is significantly better. The extended and encompassing specification are not significantly different.
relatively small number of firms. And it is in an oligopoly where there is the most scope for strategic competition. But, if oligopolists are heterogeneous, economies of scale provide a substantial advantage to the large oligopolist and limit the opportunities for strategic competition. While game theory suggests much is possible, the empirical significance could well be limited.
(
ii) Sensitivity Tests
The first sensitivity test, as described in Section IV is to check whether the car industry is best characterized as featuring separate markets for different types ( The second sensitivity test is to estimate separate Full specifications for plants producing small cars and large cars separately. The results are presented below in Table 6 . For the large producers, PT -is omitted as it perfectly predicts exit, and Size -2 is omitted as it adds little but collinearity to the equation. Though a likelihood ratio test cannot be performed to directly test if the sample split improves over specification based on the whole sample, the sum of log likelihood statistics is considerably lower. The estimates based on the sample of small car producing plants are similar to that for the sample as a whole with two exceptions.
Both the coefficients on the Multiplant variables and on PT -are now significantly different from zero. However, the coefficient on Multiplant -is negative. This could be explained by some plants being replaced by other plants while running together for some time. The positive sign on PT -is also contrary to expectations. The estimates from the sample of plants producing large cars support the Strategy (Weak) rather than Strategy (Strong) or Scale hypotheses. The results for both of these regressions suggest more is going on but we run into problem with the small sample size.
Finally, we perform a test allowing for the signs and significance of coefficients to change during the Button Plan period. Table 7 summarizes the results of the set of tests: In all cases, allowing for differences across periods 4 and 5 appears to add little to the performance of the model.
In summary, allowing for differences in demand across broad segments or differences between the Button Plan and other periods appear to have little effect on the results. When the sample was split into plants producing small cars and those producing large cars, differences did emerge. However, the small sample size makes it difficult to further develop these differences.
VII Conclusion
In this paper we attempt to assess the importance of economies of scale, firm strategies and government policy in determining the pattern of exit from the Australian car industry over the last eighty years. While the theoretical literature suggests a testable implication of the role of firm strategy, other studies have found only weak evidence in support. Using a new dataset on the Australian car industry we estimate the Basic specification used in other studies and achieve similar results.
However, we then use a more flexible form and discover evidence of strategy playing a role where differences in costs due to economies of scale may be less important.
Cost differences due to economies of scale continue to be important for larger plants.
Protection consistently reduces the likelihood of plant exit. Further tariff cuts, as part of the current government's plan for the car industry increase the likelihood of further exit, with the smallest producer, Mitsubishi, being at most risk of closure.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we detail the construction of the data. The main details are summarized in Table A. 1. 1950 , 1964 and 1983 /84 and Glass's Guide (1998 for 1997.
Models
Usually the mode of models produced at the plant by period.
(i) Registrations and number of models
Two sources are used. First for model specific data up to 1976 and aggregate data thereafter the ABS (and predecessor) publications are used: "Motor vehicles and new registrations" (1949 -1953) , "Registrations of new motor vehicles" (1953 -1965) , "Motor vehicles registrations" (1965 -1993) and "New Motor Vehicles
Registrations, Australia (preliminary)" (1993 -1998) . For model specific data from 1976 FCAI (1974 -1988) and Glass's Guide (1995 are used.
(ii) Plant Characteristics
Plant characteristics are compiled from the reports on the car industry by the Productivity Commission and its predecessors, Maxcy (1963) , Swan (1972 ), Wright (1998 ), FCAI (1959 -1970 , FCAI (1974 FCAI ( -1988 Tables A7.7 and A7.8) and Darwin (1983 Darwin ( , 1986 ). This was supplemented by the registrations data described in section (i).
(iii) Other Data.
Before 1957 there were separate tariffs on many components rather than a single tariff on cars. So the import duties paid depended on the components used in each car. We use the estimates of the rate of protection per car compiled by the Tariff Board in the 1938 and 1957 reports. In addition, separate statistics on registrations by make do not exist for the first period so the growth rate in total registrations is used.
